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Abstract. Given a consumer data-set, the axioms of revealed preference proffer a binary
test for rational behaviour. A natural (non-binary) measure of the degree of rationality ex-
hibited by the consumer is the minimum number of data points whose removal induces a
rationalisable data-set. We study the computational complexity of the resultant consumer
rationality problem in this paper. This problem is, in the worst case, equivalent (in terms
of approximation) to the directed feedback vertex set problem. Our main result is to obtain
an exact threshold on the number of commodities that separates easy cases and hard cases.
Specifically, for two-commodity markets the consumer rationality problem is polynomial
time solvable; we prove this via a reduction to the vertex cover problem on perfect graphs.
For three-commodity markets, however, the problem is NP-complete; we prove this using a
reduction from planar 3-sat that is based upon oriented-disc drawings.
1 Introduction
The theory of revealed preference, introduced by Samuelson [24,25], has long been
used in economics to test for rational behaviour. Specifically, given a set of m com-
modities with price vector p, we wish to determine whether the consumer always
demands an affordable bundle x of maximum utility. To test this question, assume
we are given a collection of consumer data {(p1,x1), (p2,x2), . . . , (pm,xm)}. Each pair
(pi,xi) denotes the fact that the consumer purchased the bundle of goods xi ∈ Rn
when the prices were pi ∈ Rn. (Here R = R≥0 denotes the set of non-negative real
numbers.) Now, assuming the consumer is rational, the selection of xi reveals infor-
mation about the consumer’s preferences; in particular, suppose that pi · xi ≥ pi · xj
for some j 6= i. This means that the bundle xj was affordable, and available for se-
lection, when xi was chosen. In this case, we say xi is directly revealed preferred to
xj and denote this xi  xj. Furthermore, suppose we observe that xi  xj and that
xj  xk. Then, by transitivity of preference, we say xi is indirectly revealed preferred
to xk.
For clarity of presentation, we will assume that all the chosen bundles are distinct
and that all revealed preferences are strict (no ties). For a rational consumer, the
data-set should then have the following property:
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The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. 1
If x1  x2, x2  x3, . . . , xk−2  xk−1 and xk−1  xk then xk  x1.
Moreover, Afriat [1] showed that the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(garp) is also sufficient for the construction of a utility function which rationalises
the data-set. That is, Afriat showed that if the consumer data satisfies garp then one
can construct a utility function v : Rn → R such that v is maximised at xi among
the set of affordable bundles at prices pi. Hence, garp is a necessary and sufficient
condition for consumer rationality.
We can represent the preferences revealed by the consumer data via a directed
graph, D = (V,A). This directed revealed preference graph contains a vertex xi ∈ V
for each data-pair (pi,xi), and an arc from xi to xj if and only if xi  xj. Observe
that garp holds if and only if the revealed preference graph is acyclic. Consequently,
Afriat’s theorem implies that the consumer is rational if and only if D contains no
directed cycles.
For example, Figure 1 displays visually two sets of consumer data. Each bundle xi
is paired with its price vector pi, and a dotted line is drawn through xi perpendicular
to pi. Note that pixi ≥ piy if and only if y lies on the opposite side of the dotted line
to the drawing of pi. Hence, for the first consumer (left), we have x3  x2, x3  x1
and x2  x1. This produces an acyclic revealed preference graph D and, therefore,
her behaviour can be rationalized. On the otherhand, the second consumer (right)
reveals x3  x2  x3. This produces a directed 2-cycle in D and, so, her behaviour
cannot be rationalised.
x1
x2
x3
p1
p2
p3
x1
x2
x3
p1 p2
p3
Fig. 1: A rational consumer and an irrational consumer.
1.1 A Measure of Consumer Rationality
We have seen that graph acyclicity can be used to provide a test for consumer rational-
ity. However such a test is binary and, in practice, leads to the immediate conclusion
of irrationality, as observed data sets typically induce cycles in the revealed prefer-
ence graph. Consequently, there has been a large body of experimental and theoretical
1 When ties are possible, this formulation is called the strong axiom of revealed preference; see
Houthakker [17]. We refer the reader to the survey by Varian [29] for details concerning the assorted
axioms of revealed preference.
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work designed to measure how close to rational the behaviour of a consumer is. Ex-
amples include measurements based upon best-fit perturbation errors (e.g. Afriat [2]
and Varian [30]), measurements based upon counting the number of rationality vio-
lations present in the data (e.g. Swofford and Whitney [28] and Famulari [15]), and
measurements based upon the maximum size of a rational subset of the data (e.g.
Koo [21] and Houtman and Maks [18]). Gross [11] provides a review and analysis of
some of these measures. Recently new measures have been designed by Echenique et
al. [10], Apesteguia and Ballester [3], and Dean and Martin [6].
Combinatorially, perhaps the most natural measure is simply to count the number
of “irrational” purchases. That is, what is the minimum number of data-points whose
removal induces a rational set of data? The associated decision problem is called the
consumer rationality problem.
CONSUMER RATIONALITY
Instance: Consumer data (p1,x1), . . . , (pm,xm) ∈ Rn ×Rn, and an integer k.
Problem: Is there a sub-collection of at most k data points whose
removal produces a data set satisfying garp?
We note that this consumer rationality problem is dual to the measure of
Houtman and Maks [18]. Using the graphical representation, it can be seen that the
consumer rationality problem is a special case of the directed feedback vertex
set problem. In fact, as we explain in Section 2, when there are many goods, the two
problems are equivalent. However, the consumer rationality problem becomes easier
to approximate as the number of commodities falls. Indeed, the main contribution
of this paper is to obtain an exact threshold on the number of commodities that
separates easy cases (polynomial) and hard cases (NP-complete). In particular, we
prove the problem is polytime solvable for a two-commodity market (Section 3), but
that it is NP-complete for a three-commodity market (Section 4).
2 The General Case: Many Commodities
In this section we show that the consumer rationality problem in full general-
ity is computationally equivalent to the directed feedback vertex set (dfvs)
problem.
DIRECTED FEEDBACK VERTEX SET
Instance: A directed graph D = (V,A), and an integer k.
Problem: Is there a set S of at most k vertices such that the induced
subgraph D[V \ S] is acyclic? (Such a set S is called a
feedback vertex set.)
First, observe that the consumer rationality problem is a special case of
the directed feedback vertex set problem: we have seen that the dataset
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is rationalizable if and only if the preference graph is acyclic. Thus, the minimum
feedback vertex set in the preference graph D clearly corresponds to the minimum
number of data points that must be removed to create a rationalizable data-set.
On the other hand, provided the number of commodities is large, dfvs is a special
case of the consumer rationality problem. Specifically, Deb and Pai [7] show
that for any directed graph D there is a data-set on m = n commodities whose
preference graph is D = D; for completeness, we include the short proof of this
result.
Lemma 2.1. [7] Given sufficiently many commodities, we may construct any digraph
as a preference graph.
Proof. Let D be any digraph on n nodes. We will construct n pairs in Rn ×Rn such
that D ∼= D. Denote pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), and set pii = 1, pij = 0 for j 6= i. Similarly,
denote xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
n), and set x
i
j = 1 if i = j, 0 if (i, j) ∈ D, and 2 if (i, j) /∈ D.
We then have, pi · xi = 1, pi · xj = 0 if we want an arc from i to j, and pi · xj = 2 if
we do not want an arc, as desired. uunionsq
It follows that any lower and upper bounds on approximation for (the optimization
version of) dfvs immediately apply to (the optimization version of) the consumer
rationality problem. The exact hardness of approximation for dfvs is not known.
The best upper bound is due to Seymour [26] who gave an O(log n log log n) approxi-
mation algorithm. With respect to lower bounds, the directed feedback vertex
set problem is NP-complete [19]. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 3, the con-
sumer rationality problem is at least as hard to approximate as vertex cover.
It follows that dfvs problem cannot be approximated to within a factor 1.36 [8] unless
P = NP . Also, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture [20], the minimum directed
feedback vertex set cannot be approximated to within any constant factor [14,27].
Lemma 2.1 shows the equivalence with directed feedback vertex set applies
when the number of commodities is at least the size of the data-set. However, Deb and
Pai [7] also show that for an m-commodity market, there exists a directed graph on
O(2m) vertices that cannot be realised as a preference graph. This suggests that the
hardness of the consumer rationality problem may vary with the quantity of goods.
Indeed, we now prove that this is the case.
3 The Case of Two Commodities
We begin by outlining the basic approach to proving polynomial solvability for two
goods. As described, the consumer rationality problem is a special case of dvfs.
For two goods, however, rather than considering all directed cycles, it is sufficient to
find a vertex hitting set for the set of digons (directed cycles consisting of two arcs).
The resulting problem can be solved by finding a minimum vertex cover in a corre-
sponding auxiliary undirected graph. The vertex cover problem is, of course, itself
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hard [8]. But we prove that the auxiliary undirected graph is perfect, and vertex
cover is polytime solvable in perfect graphs.
3.1 Two-Commodity Markets and the Vertex Cover Problem
So, our first step is to show that it suffices to hit only digons. Specifically, we prove that
every vertex-minimal cycle in the revealed preference graph D is a digon. This fact
corresponds to the result that for two goods the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
is equivalent to the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference. This equivalence was
noted by Samuelson [25] and formally proven by Rose [23] in 1958; for a recent
structurally motivated proof see [16]. For completeness, and to illustrate some of the
notation and techniques required in this paper, we present a short geometric proof
here.
We begin with the required notation. Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2, and define
x↘ := {(y1, y2) ∈ R2 : y1 ≥ x1, y2 ≤ x2} ,
i.e. the points which lie “below and to the right” of x in the plane. Define x↖, x↗ and
x↙ similarly. In addition, define x↘↘ x↖↖, x↗↗ and x↙↙ by replacing the inequalities
with strict inequalities. Furthermore, if ` is a line in the plane of non-positive slope
which intersects the positive quadrant, we say a point lies below ` if it lies in the
same closed half-plane as the origin. For each data pair (pi,xi), we define `i to be
the line through xi perpendicular to pi. Hence, in our setting xi  xj if and only if
xj lies below `i. Note that, if xi  xj, then we may not have xj ∈ x↗↗i since pi is
non-negative.
Lemma 3.1. [23] For two commodities, every minimal cycle is a digon.
Proof. Let Ck = {x0,x1, . . . ,xk−1}, listed in order, be a vertex-minimal directed
cycle in D. Suppose, for a contradiction, that k ≥ 3. By minimality, the cycle Ck is
chordless, therefore, xi  xj if and only if j = i + 1 (mod k). (Henceforth, we will
often assume without statement that indices are taken modulo k. Furthermore, “left”
will stand for the negative x direction.) Without loss of generality, suppose xi is the
leftmost bundle – or one of them. Since xi  xi+1, we have that xi+1 must fall in
x↘i . We claim that `i must be steeper than `i+1. To see this, suppose this is not true.
Then, as shown in Figure 2(a), `i+1 must intersect the line `i strictly to the left of
xi. If not, xi+1  xi. Now xi+2 lies under `i+1 but not under `i, but this implies that
xi+2 lies strictly to the left of xi as illustrated. This gives the desired contradiction.
Hence, `i must be steeper than `i+1. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2(b) where
we set j = i. We claim the following:
Claim. Suppose xj+1 ∈ x↘j and `j is steeper than `j+1, then we must have that
xj+2 ∈ x↘j+1 and that `j+1 is steeper than `j+2.
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xi+1
xi+2
`i`i+1
(a)
xj
xj+1
xj+2
`j+1
`j
(b)
Fig. 2: Leftmost 2-commodity bundles on a cycle.
As shown in Figure 2(b), because `j is steeper than `j+1, we must have xj+2 ∈ x↘j+1.
It remains to show that `j+1 is steeper than `j+2. Suppose not, then, since xj+1 must
fall above `j+2, the (highlighted) point where `j and `j+1 meet must also fall above
`j+2. Thus, the region which falls above both `j and `j+1 cannot intersect the region
below `j+2. Therefore, there is no valid position for xj+3. Consequently, `j+1 must be
steeper than `j+2, as desired.
Hence, by induction, for every 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, we have that `j is steeper than
`j+1 and that xj+1 ∈ x↘j , where our base case is j = i. However, this cannot hold for
j = i−1, since xi is the leftmost point in the cycle, amounting to a contradiction, and
refuting the assumption that there existed a minimal cycle on at least 3 vertices. uunionsq
Lemma 3.1 implies that a vertex set that intersects every digon will also inter-
sect each directed cycle of any length. Hence, to solve the consumer rationality
problem for two goods, it suffices to find a minimum cardinality hitting vertex set for
the digons of D. We can do this by transforming the problem into one of finding a
minimum vertex cover in an undirected graph. Recall the vertex cover problem
is:
VERTEX COVER
instance: Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and an integer k.
problem: Is there a set S of at most k vertices such that every edge
has an endpoint in S?
The transformation is then as follows: given the directed revealed preference graph
D we create an auxiliary undirected graph G. The vertex set V (G) = V (D) so
the undirected graph also has a vertex for each bundle xi. There is an edge (xi,xj)
in G if and only if xi and xj induce a digon in D. It is easy to verify that a vertex
cover in G corresponds to a hitting set for digons of D.
Let’s see some simple examples for the auxiliary graph G. First consider Figure
3(a), where bundles are placed on a concave curve. Now every pair of vertices xi and
xj induce a digon in D. Thus G is an undirected clique. Now consider Figure 3(b).
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The vertices on the left induce a directed path in D; the vertices along the bottom
also induce a directed path in D. However each pair consisting of one vertex on
the left and one vertex on the bottom induce a digon in D. Thus G is a complete
bipartite graph.
(a) A Complete Graph (b) A Complete Bipartite Graph
Fig. 3: Examples of the Auxiliary Undirected Graph.
3.2 Perfect Graphs
An undirected graph G is perfect if the chromatic number of any induced subgraph
is equal to the cardinality of the maximum clique in the subgraph. In 1961, Berge [4]
made the famous conjecture that an undirected graph is perfect if and only if it
contains neither an odd length hole nor an odd length antihole. Here a hole is a
chordless cycle with at least four vertices. An antihole is the complement of a chordless
cycle with at least four vertices. Berge’s conjecture was finally proven by Chudnovsky,
Robertson, Seymour and Thomas [5] in 2006.
Theorem 3.1 (The Strong Perfect Graph Theorem [5]). An undirected graph
is perfect if and only if it contains no odd holes and no odd antiholes.
There are many important classes of perfect graphs, for example, cliques, bipartitie
graphs, chordal graphs, line graphs of bipartite graphs, and comparability graphs.2
Interestingly, we now show that the class of 2D auxiliary revealed preference graphs
are also perfect. To prove this, we will need the following geometric lemma, but first,
we introduce the required notation.
Lemma 3.2. Let {xi, xj, xk}, listed in order, be an induced path in the 2D auxiliary
revealed preference graph G. If xi ∈ x↖j then xk ∈ x↖j . (Similarly, if xi ∈ x↘j then
xk ∈ x↘j .)
2 By the (Weak) Perfect Graph Theorem [22], the complements of these classes of graphs are also perfect.
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Proof. Recall the assumption that the bundles distinct, that is, xi 6= xj for all i 6= j.
Because {xi, xj} is an edge in the auxiliary undirected graph G, we know that
xi  xj and xj  xi. Therefore it cannot be the case that xi ∈ x↗↗j or xj ∈ x↗↗i .
Thus, either xj ∈ x↖i or xj ∈ x↘i , but not both. Similarly, because {xj, xk} is an
edge in G, either xk ∈ x↖j or xk ∈ x↘j .
Now, without loss of generality, let xi ∈ x↖j . For a contradiction, assume that
xk ∈ x↘j . Hence, we have xj ∈ x↘i ∩ x↖k . Suppose xj lies strictly below the line `i,k
through xi and xk. But then we cannot have both xj  xi and xj  xk. This is
because the line `j must cross the segment of `i,k between xi and xk if it is to induce
either of the two preferences. Thus, the line `j separates xi and xk and, so, at most
one of bundles can lie below the line. This is illustrated in Figure 4(a).
xi
xj xk
`j
`′j
`i,k
(a) xj below `i,k
xi
xj
xk
`i
`k
`i,k
(b) xj above or on `i,k
Fig. 4: Induced path on three vertices.
On the other hand, suppose xj lies on or above the line `i,k through xi and xk.
Now we know that xi  xj. This implies that xi  xk, as illustrated in Figure 4(b).
Furthermore, we know that xk  xj which implies that xk  xi. Thus {xi, xk} is an
edge in G. This contradicts the fact that {xi, xj, xk} is an induced path. uunionsq
Lemma 3.3. The 2D auxiliary revealed preference graph G contains no odd holes
on at least 5 vertices.
Proof. Take a hole Ck = {x0,x1, . . . ,xk−1}, listed in order, where k ≥ 5 is odd.
For any 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the three vertices {xi−1,xi,xi+1} induce a path in G.
Consequently, by Lemma 3.2, either both xi−1 and xi+1 are in x
↖
i or both xi−1 and
xi+1 are in x
↘
i . In the former case, colour xi yellow. In the latter case, colour xi red.
Thus we obtain a 2-coloring of Ck. Since k is odd, there must be two adjacent vertices,
xi and xi+1, with the same colour. Without loss of generality, let both vertices be
yellow. Thus, xi+1 is x
↖
i and xi is in x
↖
i+1. This contradicts the distinctness of xi and
xi+1. uunionsq
We remark that the parity condition in Lemma 3.3 is necessary. To see this consider
the example in Figure 5 which produces an even hole on six vertices. Specifically, the
only mutually adjacent pairs are the (xi,xi+1) pairs, with indices taken modulo 6.
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x1
x2
x3
x4 x5
x6
Fig. 5: Construction for C6
Lemma 3.4. The 2D auxiliary revealed preference graph G contains no antiholes
on at least 5 vertices.
Proof. Note that the complement of an odd hole on five vertices is also an odd hole.
Thus, by Lemma 3.3, the graph G may not contain an antihole on five vertices.
Next consider an antihole C¯k = {x0,x1, . . . ,xk−1}, listed in order, with k ≥ 6.
The neighbours in C¯k of xi, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, are Γi = {xi+2,xi+3, . . . ,xi−2}.
We claim that either every vertex of Γi is in x
↖
i or every vertex of Γi is in x
↘
i . To see
this note that (xi+2,xi+3) is not an edge, and therefore {xi+2,xi,xi+3} is an induced
path in G. By Lemma 3.2, without loss of generality, both xi+2 and xi+3 are in
x↖i . But {xi+3,xi,xi+4} is also an induced path in G. Consequently, as xi+3 is in
x↖i , Lemma 3.2 implies that xi+4 is in x
↖
i . Repeating this argument through to the
induced path {xi−3,xi,xi−2} gives the claim.
Now consider the three vertices x0,x2 and x4. Since k ≥ 6 these vertices are
pairwise adjacent in C¯k. Without loss of generality, by the claim, Γ0 is in x
↖
0 . Thus,
x2 and x4 are in x
↖
0 . However x0 is in Γ2 ∩ Γ4. Thus every vertex in Γ2 is in x↘2 and
every vertex in Γ2 is in x
↘
4 . Hence, x4 is in x
↘
2 and x2 is in x
↘
4 , a contradiction. uunionsq
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 together show, by applying the Strong Perfect Graph Theo-
rem, that the auxiliary undirected graph is perfect.
Theorem 3.2. The 2D auxiliary revealed preference graph G is perfect. uunionsq
3.3 A Polynomial Time Algorithm
In classical work, Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [12,13] show that the vertex
cover problem in a perfect graph can be solved in polynomial time via the ellipsoid
method.
Theorem 3.3. [12] The vertex cover problem is solvable in polynomial time on
a perfect graph. uunionsq
But by Theorem 3.2, the auxiliary undirected graph is perfect. Since the consumer
rationality problem for two commodities corresponds to a vertex cover problem on
this auxiliary undirected graph, we have:
Theorem 3.4. In a two-commodity market, the consumer rationality problem
is solvable in polynomial time. uunionsq
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4 The Case of Three Commodities
We have shown that for two commodities, the consumer rationality problem can be
solved in polynomial time. We now prove the problem is NP-complete if there are
three (or more) commodities by presenting a reduction from planar 3-sat. The
proof has three parts: first we transform an instance of planar 3-sat to an instance
of vertex cover in an associated undirected gadget graph. Second, we show that
a vertex cover in the gadget graph corresponds to a directed feedback vertex set
in a directed oriented disc graph. Finally, we prove that every oriented disc graph
corresponds to a preference graph in a three-commodity market. Consequently, we
can solve planar 3-sat using an algorithm for the three-commodity case of the
consumer rationality problem.
We begin by defining the class of oriented-disc graphs. Let {x1, . . . , xn} be points
in the plane and let {B1, . . . , Bn} be closed discs of varying radii such that Bi contains
xi on its boundary. We call this collection of points and discs an oriented-disc drawing.
Given a drawing, we construct a directed graph D = (V,A) on the vertex set V =
{x1, . . . ,xn}. There is an arc from xi to xj in D if xj, j 6= i, is contained in the disc
Bi. A directed graph that can be built in this manner is called an oriented-disc graph.
x1
x2
x3
x1
x2x3
Fig. 6: An oriented disc drawing and its corresponding oriented disc graph.
An example is given in Figure 6. The oriented-disc drawing is shown on the left
and the the resulting oriented disc graph, a directed cycle on 3 vertices, is shown on
the right. (We remark that, for enhanced clarity in the larger figures that follow, the
boundary circles are drawn half-dotted.) Note that, even if the discs have uniform
radii, the resulting oriented-disc graphs need not be symmetric – that is, (xi,xj) can
be an arc even if (xj,xi) is not. This is due to the fact that xi lies on the boundary, not
at the centre, of its disc Bi. We now start by proving the third part of the reduction:
every oriented disc graph corresponds to a preference graph in a three-commodity
market.
Lemma 4.1. Every oriented-disc graph corresponds to a preference graph induced by
consumer data in a three-commodity market.
Proof. Let D be any oriented-disc graph. We wish to build a three-commodity data
set whose preference graph is D. Recall that the plane is homomorphic to the 2-
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dimensional sphere minus a point. Moreover, the inverse of the stereographic projection
is a map from the plane to a sphere which preserves the shape of circles; see, for
example, [9]. This motivates us to attempt to draw the points and discs on the unit
sphere centered at (1, 1, 1) ∈ R3. To do this, we scale the oriented-disc drawing
appropriately and embed it in a small region on the “underside” of the sphere, that
is, around the point where the inwards normal vector is (1, 1, 1). An example of this,
where the oriented-disc graph is the directed 3-cycle, is shown in Figure 7(a).
We now need to create the corresponding collection of consumer data. Let {x1, . . . , xn}
be the n points of some oriented-disc drawing of D embedded onto the underside of
the sphere. Note that the intersection of a sphere and a plane is a circle. Furthermore,
a plane through a point on the sphere will create a circle containing that point. Thus
we may select the xi to be the bundles chosen by the market and we may choose
pi such that the plane with normal pi that passes through xi intersects the sphere
exactly along the boundary of the embedding of the disc Bi. An example is shown
in Figure 7(b). Because pi is non-negative it points into the sphere. Therefore, xi
is revealed preferred to every point on the inside of the embedding of Bi; it is not
revealed preferred to any other point on the sphere. Hence, the preference graph D
is isomorphic to the original oriented-disc graph, as desired. uunionsq
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: A 3-cycle embedded on a sphere section, and a disc on a sphere.
Now, recall the first part of the reduction: we wish to transform an instance of
planar 3-sat to an instance of vertex cover in an associated undirected gadget
graph. Our gadget graph is based upon a network used by Wang and Kuo [31] to
prove the hardness of maximum independent set in undirected unit-disc graphs.
However, we are able to simplify their non-planar network by using an instance of
planar 3-sat rather than the general 3-sat. This simplification will be useful when
implementing the second part of the reduction.
Let ϕ be an instance of planar 3-sat with variables u1, . . . , un and clauses
C1, . . . , Cm. Recall that ϕ is planar if the bipartite graph Hϕ consisting of a vertex
for each variable, a vertex for each clause, and edges connecting each clause to its
11
three variables, is planar. The associated, undirected, gadget graph Gϕ is constructed
as shown in Figure 8. For each clause C = (ui ∨ uj ∨ uk), add a 3-cycle to the graph
whose vertices are labelled by the appropriate literals for the variables ui, uj and uk.
We call these the clause gadgets. For each variable ui, add a large cycle of even length
whose vertices are alternatingly labelled as the literals ui and u¯i. We call these the
variable gadgets. Finally, add an edge from each variable in the clause gadgets to some
vertex on the corresponding variable gadget with the opposite label – we choose a
different variable vertex for each clause it is contained in.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
u¯1
u2
u3
u1
u¯2
u3
u¯3
u3
u¯2
u2
u¯1
u1
u3
u¯3
u2
u¯2
u1
u¯1
u1 variable gadget
u2 variable gadget
u3 variable gadget
C
1
cl
au
se
g
ad
g
et
C
2
clau
se
g
ad
g
et
Fig. 8: The gadget graph Gϕ for ϕ = (u¯1 ∨ u2 ∨ u3) ∧ (u1 ∨ u¯2 ∨ u3).
The next lemma is equivalent to the result shown by Wang and Kuo [31].
Lemma 4.2. [31] The planar 3-sat instance ϕ is satisfiable if and only if Gϕ has
vertex cover set of size at most 2m+ 1
2
∑n
i=1 ri, where ri is the number of vertices in
the variable gadget’s cycle for ui.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is satisfiable. Take any satisfying assignment, and let U be the set
of literals which take true values in the assignment, i.e. the literal “ui” if the variable
ui was assigned true, and the literal “u¯i” if the variable ui was assigned false. Let
U¯ be the remaining literals. Now, every vertex in a variable gadget of Gϕ whose label
is in U¯ will be selected to be in the vertex cover. In total this amounts to 1
2
∑n
i=1 ri
vertices, and these cover every edge in the variable gadgets of Gϕ. Next consider
the clause gadgets of Gϕ. We must select two vertices of each clause gadget to cover
the edges of the 3-cycle. This amounts to 2m vertices. Since we have a satisfying
assignment and we chose the nodes corresponding to U¯ in the variable gadgets, each
clause gadget must have at least one incident edge covered by the variable gadgets’
selected vertices. Hence, selecting the other two vertices will cover all incident edges
to the clause gadgets, and all edges of the gadget’s cycle. Thus we have a vertex cover
with 2m+ 1
2
∑n
i=1 ri nodes. For example, in Figure 8, if we set all variables to false,
one possible vertex cover is the set of vertices labelled with non-negated literals, i.e.
those coloured in white. (Note, clearly, the set of white vertices will not typically form
a vertex cover in the gadget graph.)
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Conversely, suppose we have a vertex cover C containing at most 2m +∑ni=1 ri2
vertices. Each variable gadget must contribute at least ri
2
vertices, otherwise we cannot
cover every edge in its cycle. Each clause gadget must contribute at least two vertices,
or one edge in the 3-cycle will be uncovered. Hence, C contains exactly 2m+∑ni=1 ri2
vertices. The 1
2
ri vertices from the variable gadget for ui corresponds either to the set
of all vertices with negated labels or to the set with non-negated labels, otherwise there
is an uncovered edge in the cycle. This induces a truth assignment; set ui to true if
all the “u¯i”-labelled vertices are selected, and false if the “ui”-labelled vertices are
selected. Furthermore this is a satisfying assignment. To see this note that as C covers
all edges, the unselected vertex in each clause is a literal which evaluates to true by
the selected assignment. uunionsq
Hence, to solve for the satisfiability of ϕ, it suffices to test whether Gϕ admits a
vertex cover with at most 2m + 1
2
∑n
i=1 ri vertices. It remains to show the second of
the three parts of the reduction. That is, we need to show that this vertex cover
problem in the undirected gadget graph can be solved by finding a minimum directed
feedback vertex set in an oriented-disc graph Dϕ. The basic idea is straightforward
(albeit that the implementation is intricate). The oriented-disc graph Dϕ will contain
a digon for each edge in some Gϕ. However, it will also contain a collection of addi-
tional arcs. The key fact will be that these additional arcs form an acyclic subgraph
of Dϕ. Thus every cycle in Dϕ must induce a digon. Consequently, a minimum di-
rected feedback vertex set need only intersect each digon to ensure that every cycle
is hit. As argued previously, hitting the underlying graph formed by the digons of
Dϕ corresponds to selecting a vertex cover in Gϕ, as desired. We now formalise this
argument.
Lemma 4.3. For every instance ϕ of planar 3-sat, there exists an oriented-disc
graph Dϕ on which the directed feedback vertex set problem is equivalent to
the vertex cover problem on Gϕ.
Proof. We prove this by explicitly constructing the oriented-disc drawing. Recall the
disc graph Dϕ should contain a digon for each edge in Gϕ. To do this, we begin with
sufficiently a large planar drawing of Hϕ, the planar bipartite network associated
with ϕ. At each clause vertex, we place an oriented-disc construction for the clause
gadget. This construction, along with its resulting graph, is shown in Figure 9. The
figure shows a clause gadget and a section of each of the neighbouring three variable
gadgets to which it is attached. Observe from the figure that, as claimed, the set of
arcs created in Dϕ which are not in a digon, form an acyclic subgraph of Dϕ.
It remains to construct the large cycles for the variable gadgets, and connect them
to the clause gadgets. However, parts of these cycles are already included in the clause
gadgets. Thus, it suffices to join these cycle segments together via paths of digons.
This can be done via the oriented disc constructions shown in Figure 10. To draw
the cycle for some variable, say ui, we note that ui’s vertex in the planar network
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Fig. 9: Oriented-disc construction of the clause gadget, and its resulting graph.
(a) Straight line (b) Curve
Fig. 10: Paths of bidirected edges as oriented-disc drawings.
u1 u2
u3
u4
C1
C3C2
Fig. 11: Gϕ as an oriented-disc graph.
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Hϕ shares and edge with every clause gadget which connects to ui’s gadget. Hence,
as illustrated in Figure 11, we may follow along the edges of Hϕ to construct the
cycle. For example, in the figure, the variable cycle for u1 (highlighted) follows the
topology of the edges incident to u1’s vertex, and joins the clause gadgets (circled) to
one another.
Observe that constructions in Figure 10 produce paths of digons in Dϕ, where
every arc produced is contained in a digon. It follows that the only arcs in Dϕ that
are not in digons are in the neighbourhoods of the clause gadgets and, as we have
seen, these are acyclic. But then, to hit all the cycles in Dϕ, it suffices to hit all the
digons, which, in turn, corresponds to a vertex cover in Gϕ, completing the proof. uunionsq
This completes all the steps in the reduction and we obtain:
Theorem 4.1. The consumer rationality problem is NP-complete for a market
with at least 3 commodities. uunionsq
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